ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE COUNTER – REVOLUTION ((CONTINUED FROM PART 2)
At first (The Counter Revolution) it aimed to strike the first major blow of its offensive in 2002. However, after a thorough analysis it concluded that this would be too early as there was no guarantee that this first blow would be successful. It therefore postponed this first strike to 2007.
The fact that this was 13 years after the democratic transition of 1994 indicated the amount of detailed work the Counter-Revolution felt it had to do to ensure the certainty of its victory. This length of time also indicated the time it spent to ensure that its offensive proceeded without undue interruption.
Finally, the Counter-Revolution decided to deliver its first major blow in 2007.
This would be directed directly against the ANC during its elective 52nd National Conference in December of that year. Specifically, the Counter-Revolution sought to ensure that the balance of forces within the National Executive Committee that would be elected at the Conference would tilt in its favour.
The Counter-Revolution could work for such an outcome because it knew that the ANC had not succeeded to clean itself of the many agents which the apartheid intelligence services had infiltrated into the organisation during the years of struggle against the apartheid regime.
So determined was the Counter-Revolution to change the leadership of the ANC in its favour, it even brought a killer-squad to Polokwane, the venue of the Conference, mainly constituted of the so-called ‘izinkabi’ from KZN, to carry out a bloodbath in the event that it did not achieve its objectives through the Conference electoral process.
It reckoned that after such a bloodbath, the ANC would be obliged to appoint an Interim leadership. It was certain that in such an eventuality, it would ensure that it controlled this Interim leadership.
Fortunately, there was no bloodbath. This was because the Counter-Revolution was happy with the outcome of the Conference electoral process.
As intended, that victory of the Counter-Revolution in Polokwane in December 2007 created the opening and possibility for it seriously to engage its sustained offensive to defeat the ANC and the National Democratic Revolution.
It is within this context that we must understand the abrupt change from Age One to Age Two.
The specific tasks the Counter-Revolution set itself were:
• radically to weaken the capacity of the ANC to ‘think for itself’ as a revolutionary-democratic movement, weaken and ultimately destroy it;
• to ensure that the ANC fails as a governing party by:
– weakening the State governance and service delivery institutions, including the South African Revenue Service (SARS);
– weakening and rendering ineffective the State-Owned Enterprises, including Eskom, Transnet, Denel and others; and,
– using these interventions to create various shortfalls in goods and services that would severely compromise the quality of governance and therefore the capacity to meet vital national needs.
It is not the task of this paper to discuss in any detail how the Counter-revolution fared as it pursued these objectives. However, it is necessary that we convey a few facts in this regard.
When the ANC acceded to state power, it attracted into its ranks people who saw membership of the organisation as a step ladder to access state power and abuse this power for corrupt purposes, including self-enrichment.
It is true that even some of the older members of the Movement also abandoned their adherence to the long-established value system of the organisation and helped to corrupt the organisation and the state organs in which they served.
The successful intervention of the Counter-Revolution in the ANC in 2007 worsened and entrenched this problem of the erosion within the ANC of its value system, including its honest and principled adherence to the goal of serving the people.
The decisions taken at successive National Conferences of the ANC calling for ‘ANC renewal’ relate to the absolute imperative for the organisation carefully to audit its membership and ensure that its ranks are made up of people genuinely committed to the task to serve the people.
Without this, it will be impossible to ensure that such crimes as corruption do not originate from within the ANC, and therefore its members.
One of the post-Polokwane interventions of the Counter-Revolution was its attempt to destroy SARS. The critical importance of this, relative to the very survival of the democratic order, is underlined by the fact that at least 95% of the revenues of the Democratic State are provided by SARS.
A group of ANC veterans co-authored an extensive document discussing this SARS matter. The document is entitled ‘DISCUSSION DOCUMENT ON COUNTER REVOLUTION, STATE CAPTURE AND CORRUPTION IN SOUTH AFRICA: MAY 2019.’
Drawing in part on the Nugent and Zondo Commissions of Inquiry, it fully explains how the Counter-Revolution tried to destroy SARS, in order to deny the ANC-led government the resources it needed to discharge any and all of its responsibilities.
The co-authors are Mongane Wally Serote, Snuki Zikalala, Aziz Pahad, Thami Ntenteni and Fazel Randera. We understand that they will recirculate the document through the social media.
For a number of years, the country ran into serious problems of shortage of electricity, with the consequent power cuts, or load shedding. Necessarily, this had a detrimental impact on the economy as well as the general quality of life of the population as a whole.
Precisely because the major power utility in our country, Eskom, is a State-Owned Enterprise, it was natural that the blight of electricity shortages would be seen as a direct failure of the ANC-led government, which, in turn, would result in the ANC losing support among the electorate.
This was and is exactly one of the central objectives of the Counter-Revolution.
Another document which will also soon be circulated is entitled ‘Counter-Revolution, State Capture and Corruption in South Africa: The Curious Case of Eskom’.
It is co-authored by Jacob Maroga, Ribbon Mosholi and Thabo Mbeki. It fully explains how the Counter-Revolution impacted on the supply of electricity, with the political result we have indicated.
[Incidentally, as part of the narrative of ‘disaster’ since 1994, there has been persistent exaggeration of the frequency of ‘load-shedding’. The CSIR graph immediately below reflects on this matter. If we discount the years 2007-8, for the reasons given earlier, we therefore see that the country experienced load-shedding during the years 2014-5 and 2018-24. The claim that there has been load-shedding throughout the years of democratic government is false.]
The four colours in the 2021 column, from bottom upwards represent Stages 1 to 4.
We are certain that a forensic examination of what has happened to Transnet during the last 15 or so years would also show how deliberate interventions were made to incapacitate this vital cog in the functioning of the national economy.
It is not the intention of this document to present a comprehensive analysis of the grave damage caused to our country during the last 15 years, at least.
However, it seeks to emphasise that it is impossible correctly to understand ‘the state of the nation’ without conducting an objective analysis of the activities of the Counter-Revolution and the great damage it has done to the country during the last 15 years, at least, as it has conducted an offensive to defeat the ANC and the National Democratic Revolution.
A VIEW ON THE STATE OF THE ANC
In a Chapter headed “Cash in the Cushions – the Phala Phala Saga” in his book “Odyssey of Liberation: A Memoir of a Rebel Advocate”, Advocate Muzi Sikhakhane SC writes:
I must admit that I have always been critical of President Ramaphosa since the 1980s. However, this did not mean that I would never represent him as a client. In fact, I took briefs from his office and did what I was supposed to do because our work as advocates is not based on personal preferences. Nonetheless, I knew that assisting (Arthur) Fraser on the Phala Phala saga would have serious repercussions for both of us. I am constrained from delving into the details of this case because it is far from over…
I say no more on this except that I learned through this period that some of the comrades I had known and trusted were actually part of whatever Cyril Ramaphosa was doing in the liberation movement. I have also learned that we do not really know all the askaris that were in the ANC. Having watched with much pain what has happened to the ANC, I have concluded that Craig Williamson was not the only sleeper within the ANC. In fact, he may not have been the most successful apartheid sleeper in the ANC. The most successful ones are those that continued to be trusted even years after 1994 and continue to occupy leadership positions today. That, in my view, has been the success story of infiltrating the ANC in order to ensure that it remains within the clutches of White capital, both domestically and internationally.
It is for this reason that the ANC has reached a point of no return. It has not been killed by outsiders only. Its death or change of direction has been orchestrated largely from within by those who have patiently been in it for decades and yet part of the anti-African agenda seeking to destroy the ANC from within. What a successful job they have done. To fool all of us requires a master plan. We were fooled by people very close to us and our struggle. It is now irredeemable. One must accept defeat in this regard. In any event, for my part as an advocate, I never regretted representing my clients. I knew I was doing the right thing to represent anyone that needs assistance, but it comes with its own repercussions.
[Odyssey of Liberation: A Memoir of a Rebel Advocate, by Muzi Sikhakhane SC. Xarra Books (Pty) Ltd, Midrand: South Africa, 2024.]
Members of the ANC will tell whether the time has come for them to give up on the ANC because it has become “irredeemable”!
For our part, the conclusion we must emphasise is that none of the Government documents to which we have referred contains any objective analysis of the grave damage to our country caused by the Counter-Revolution.
Necessarily, this inexcusable failure has its own very negative consequences.
THE MEDIUM-TERM DEVELOPMENT PLAN 2024 – 29 (MTDP)
Correctly, the Executive Summary (ES) of the MTDP observes that:
…as the country marks 30 years of democracy, it faces unprecedented social and economic challenges. The economy has not grown at a rate fast enough to create jobs for all those of working age. Too many South Africans are excluded from economic opportunity, and access to education, healthcare and other basic services remains unequal.”
In the Chapter on Strategic Priority I, the document goes further to say:
Apart from the period 2005-2007, when GDP growth reached 5% per annum, South Africa’s economy has struggled to achieve the rate of growth required to achieve a significant increase in employment and incomes. South Africa’s long-running growth has been weak compared to peer countries…Growth slowed sharply in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis. Despite a significant increase in public spending, it did not recover and dropped further below other emerging markets.”
The EXECUTIVE SUMMARY concludes by saying:
As outlined in the NDP and the GNU Statement of Intent, this MTDP 2024–2029 presents the priority interventions that are required to address the most critical challenges confronting South Africa over the next five years. The overriding priority is to achieve more rapid, inclusive and sustained economic growth while implementing interventions to address poverty and inequality.”
The MTDP then lists as its Apex Strategic Priority I the objective to ‘Drive inclusive Growth and Job Creation’.
While listing the gaols set in the National Development Plan, including the 5.4% growth rate in the period up to 2030, and reducing the unemployment rate to 6% by 2030, the MTDP “targets achieving a GDP growth rate of more than 3.0% by 2029, which is projected to reduce unemployment to below 28.0% by the end-term.”
The MTDP Strategic Priority I Chapter discusses a whole range of interventions including:
• the Presidential Employment Stimulus;
• investing in small business and the informal sector;
• reindustrialisation;
• public-private cooperation;
• extraction and use of critical minerals from mining;
• Operation Vulindlela structural reforms;
• sectoral Master Plans;
• the energy sector;
• infrastructure investment;
• electricity generation and transmission;
• freight logistics;
• the water sector;
• skills training;
• the green economy;
• tourism;
• science, technology and innovation; and,
• economic inclusion of women, youth and people with disabilities.
In this context, the MTDP says:
“(The) strategic priority (of inclusive growth and job creation) will be achieved through nine strategic outcomes in key areas of the economy over the next five years. These are:
• increased employment and work opportunities;
• accelerated growth of strategic industrial and labour-intensive sectors;
• enabling environment for investment and improved competitiveness through
structural reforms;
• increased infrastructure investment, access and efficiency;
• improved energy security and a just energy transition;
• increased trade and investment;
• a dynamic science, technology and innovation ecosystem for growth;
• supportive and sustainable economic policy environment; and
• economic transformation and equitable inclusion of women, youth and persons with
disabilities for a just society.”
The MTDP is called a Plan!
Its various sections, like the one on ‘Inclusive Economic Growth and Job Creation’ are themselves elements of that Plan!
Given the very serious socio-economic problems facing South Africa, as admitted and explained by the MTDP itself, requiring urgent practical attention, we must ask the question – is the MTDP in all its sections a Plan?
To some extent, the MTDP itself has answered this question.
In the Chapter on its Strategic Priority I, it includes an important sub-section headed “Key Risks and Mitigations”. Below we reproduce the greater part of this section because of the observations it makes about what has not been done to produce an actual Plan. In the main, this Section says:
The primary risk to the successful implementation of the suite of interventions that comprise this Strategic Priority is political instability or a lack of agreement between political parties on key policy issues. An important measure to mitigate these risks has already been taken with the establishment of the GNU and the publication of its Statement of Intent. This should be underpinned by detailed governance arrangements to ensure that there is a coordinated approach across all government institutions. Mechanisms must be put in place to ensure efficient decision-making processes and swift implementation strategies to avoid policy paralysis.
A further risk is that the implementation of priority interventions might be delayed by a failure to achieve the necessary consensus beyond government and across society on key elements. It is relevant to note that policy disagreement and paralysis have been the root cause of the failure to achieve growth outcomes over the past decade. This risk may be mitigated by engagements with social partners in forums such as NEDLAC. However, given the current low levels of trust among political role players, the involvement of civil society and the recognition of its role in monitoring the implementation of the MTDP 2024-2029 and the contributions of the various GNU partners will be critical and must be supported.
It is essential to consider several key risks in the economy and in respect of unemployment. One significant concern is insufficient collaboration between the public and private sectors in the development and execution of sector specific industry Master Plans. To address this risk, fostering PPPs aligned with the public interest, particularly in creating labour-intensive jobs and promoting inclusive economic growth, should be prioritised. Another risk involves potential inconsistencies within the system, stemming from existing incentives and sector support programmes that do not effectively encourage scalable investments or deliver the desired outcomes. This risk can be mitigated by reviewing and refining current incentives and support programmes to ensure they are geared towards promoting scalable investments, are results-driven and achieve their intended objectives.
The complexity of the PPP regulatory framework may impede infrastructure investment. Simplifying this framework can alleviate this risk and encourage more robust investment. There is also a risk that direct public investment may not yield sustainable outcomes. It is therefore crucial to prioritise effective implementation strategies, such as engaging private sector partners.”
The various observations in this section of the MTDP point exactly to the defect and shortfall that though the MTDP calls itself a Plan, it is not a detailed document about the socio-economic renewal of South Africa, indicating what specific task would be performed by whom and within what time frame!
A Real Development Plan would:
◊ include the details of what should be done in each sector of the economy;
◊ indicate what tasks should be carried out by each of the economic players, these being respectively, government, business, workers and civil society;
◊ give time frames within which each of these must carry out the prescribed task/s; and,
◊ indicate the broad socio-economic outcomes that would be realised through the implementation of the Plan, such as the reduction of the rates and levels of unemployment and poverty.
The MTDP does not do any of these things.
Please Note: the critical observations concerning the MTDP would apply with even greater force to the document, ‘Wider Horizons ׀ New Frontiers: Integrated Industrial Policy & Economic Growth Path’.
The reality is that our country does not have an implementable Development Plan capable of successfully addressing the well-known national challenges such as:
● the extremely low economic growth rates;
● the failure to develop an inclusive, transformative economy;
● the intolerably high and ever-increasing unemployment rates;
● the similarly high and ever-increasing poverty levels; and,
● the record-breaking high levels of income and wealth inequality.
Practically, this means that unless this disastrous situation is addressed, and urgently, the majority of our people will continue to sink into ever-worsening impoverishment.
This is a recipe for a very destructive social explosion in future, which will truly tear our country apart!
OPERATION VULINDLELA
In this context, much has been said about the positive contribution that has been and will be made by ‘Operation Vulindlela’ (OV).
OV Phase II itself says:
An average growth rate of at least 3% is required over the medium term in order to reduce unemployment and improve the lives of all South Africans. Rapid implementation of bold reforms is needed to enable faster and more resilient growth. To achieve this, a “second wave” of reform will be implemented through Operation Vulindlela to remove the obstacles to growth and job creation, while enabling more inclusive, broad-based growth and greater economic complexity.”
It amplifies this statement later by saying:
A recent independent study by the Bureau of Economic Research (BER) estimates that OV reforms could increase real GDP growth to 3.5% by 2029, or 1.5% above the baseline. The immediate priority is therefore to complete the reforms underway and deepen those reforms that have already been initiated.”
OV Phase II says that in its work to bring about the required structural reforms, it will focus on:
• electricity generation and transmission;
• freight logistics;
• a national water action plan;
• visa reform to encourage skilled immigration;
• strengthening local government for improved service delivery;
• dynamic and integrated cities; and,
• public digital infrastructure.
In addition, OV Phase II insists on “green and digital” economic growth and development for our country. It therefore draws attention to the need to focus on ‘renewable energy’ and ensuring that South Africa becomes “a key player in the digital economy”.
For our current purposes, we will not dwell on the matter of the focal sectors identified by OV Phase II.
Rather, we wish to return to the prediction made by the BER that “the OV reforms could increase real GDP growth to 3.5% by 2029.”
This means that the ‘OV reforms’ would result in a significantly high and sustained rate of investment in the economy to produce the outcome of “increase(ing) real GDP growth to 3.5% by 2029”.
In this regard, OV Phase II repeatedly refers to facilitating private investment in the various focal areas it has identified which are historically in the public sector.
Of course, it is necessary that the State should access some privately owned capital to help it make the necessary investments in the areas in which it is an economy player, such as the State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs).
However, it would be important to pay detailed attention to this as it must be absolutely prohibited that the public monopolies, such as the Water Authorities and others, are turned into private monopolies!
In this regard, it is not difficult to understand why private capital would be keen to acquire the erstwhile public enterprises exactly because this does not result in such risk as, for instance, would attend building a furniture factory in a strongly competitive furniture manufacturing sector.
Unfortunately, in its document OV Phase II does not provide enough information to enable us to judge whether the suggested intervention of private capital in the public sector is intended to supplement or to displace state capital!
Already some in our country have raised an alarm in this regard, an alarm we dare not ignore!
URGENT ALERT ABOUT TRANSNET
On 30 April 2025, the periodical, ‘The Telegram’, published an article by Themba Khumalo entitled ‘The Quiet Coup: South Africa’s Freight System In The Crosshairs’.
Among others it says:
You might think I’m obsessed with Transnet—but this isn’t an obsession, it’s a warning. There’s a quiet war being waged in boardrooms, dressed up in crisis language and PowerPoint lies. Predators in suits are circling, and they are not here to fix anything—they are here to feast. If we don’t call it out now, Transnet will be stripped to the bone and sold off to the highest bidder, while we’re left choking on the ashes of what was ours…
There exists a briefing document that paints a damning portrait of the National Logistics Crisis Committee (NLCC), the presidential structure established to resolve the country’s escalating logistics dysfunction.
Far from being a neutral coordination mechanism, the document alleges the NLCC is part of a methodical “soft coup” to privatise Transnet, South Africa’s state-owned freight and logistics company, without public mandate or parliamentary oversight…
At the centre of this strategy is the Freight Logistics Roadmap (FLRM), ostensibly a recovery blueprint. Yet according to the briefing, the FLRM is not about fixing Transnet—it is about dismantling it. It maps out a route to open up freight corridors to private operators, not as complementary support but as replacements for the state.
In effect, it lays the groundwork for a logistics system no longer governed by the public interest, but captured by private capital.
“The Infrastructure Reform and Economic Regulation Committee (IRERC), a key advisory structure, is described in the document as a “shadow government” operating behind closed doors…
“Throughout this, the Department of Transport—the institution legally responsible for Transnet—has remained disturbingly silent. Whether through negligence or deliberate abstention, its absence in this process has allowed the covert restructuring of the logistics sector to proceed unchecked…
South Africans have seen this movie before. Eskom. SAA. Denel. Now, Transnet. The formula is familiar: starve the institution, delegitimise it, manufacture a crisis, and then sell the solution. What is different this time is the scale—and the audacity…
“What must follow now is public scrutiny. A full investigation into the allegations. Transparent accounting of who funds what, who decides what, and who stands to benefit. Because the question is no longer whether Transnet is failing. It is: who is orchestrating that failure—and why?
“This is not the reform we were promised. This is a slow, quiet theft of a nation’s arteries—its ports, its rail, its logistical heartbeat. And if we continue to look away, we will soon wake up to find the state has not only lost control but sold it.”
The Sunday World followed up this story in an article which appeared on 1 June 2025 and was republished in the newspaper website on 3 June 2025 entitled ‘Cyril’s office ‘backs’ hijack of Transnet policy’, by Setumo Stone and Bongani Mdakane.
For its part, the newspaper says:
Bombshell minutes of a meeting held by Business for South Africa (B4SA) and Interim Rail Economic Regulator Capacity (IRERC) have revealed a plan by top private players in the rail sector to hijack state rail policy and redirect prized assets of Transnet into private hands, allegedly with the blessing of the office of President Cyril Ramaphosa.
“At the centre of the controversial move is rail industry guru Jan-Louis Spoelstra, who, during a virtual meeting with other sector stakeholders on February 17, alleged that the Presidency backed IRERC, a team of ministerial advisers led by economists and experts, to dictate to the Transnet Rail Infrastructure manager (Trim) on the development of a policy document titled “Network Statement”, which sets out rules and tariffs for the use of the rail network by private operators…
Yet the leaked minutes point to a stunning level of direct influence, with IRERC seemingly dictating terms. The minutes describe a January meeting where business leaders briefed Ramaphosa on “problems” with the network statement, prompting an immediate ministerial order to Transnet to follow IRERC’s recommendations – no questions asked.
“The level of intervention extends to enforcement, Spoelstra recounted, “The president’s intervention led to an instruction to Transnet by the minister…” Barbaba Creecy, the transport minister, thus emerges as an active enforcer of business-driven policy, with the minutes documenting that the “minister of transport then instructed Transnet… to implement all that IRERC recommended.”
“Ian Bird of B4SA said: “Any concerns that IRERC has… are taken up immediately by the minister and very robustly with the Transnet board and Trim executives. So I think we have a conduit through that process.”…
Director at Gauteng Transcribers, Prenita Govender, confirmed the authenticity of the minutes…
“(Spoelstra, a former member of IRERC) said he had accepted an invitation from B4SA to attend a session to encourage participation in the IRERC information-gathering session on February 17, 2025.
“The aim of the session was to ensure constructive participation to see that the Railway Policy as well as the Roadmap for the Freight Logistics System in South Africa as approved by cabinet be supported.”…
“Creecy yesterday declined to comment on the “third-party pronouncements made in a meeting she did not mandate, sanction, or approve”…
“Presidency spokesperson Vincent Magwenya said yesterday…“There was no instruction or directive from the president, or the Presidency, to anybody to undertake any action outside of the prescribed policy that is guiding the process.”
It seems clear that the Themba Khumalo we cited earlier also had sight of the minutes quoted by the Sunday World reporters.
We must say this with regard to these reports published by ‘The Telegram’ and the ‘Sunday World’, that, the story has been circulating in the grapevine for months that concerned people within the Government Presidency have been saying that their task is to keep Transnet within the State sector, while ensuring that it was nothing but “an empty shell”, with its assets having been privatised!
OTHER MATTERS CONCERNING STATE CAPITAL
This has been discussed in connection with two other troubling developments relating to the matter of the role and place of State capital in the context of the National Democratic Revolution.
The two matters are:
● the abolition of the Ministry and Department of Public Enterprises; and,
● the dispersal of control of the agglomerations of State capital among the various
Ministries.
We will discuss the importance of these two matters later in this document.
One of the priorities contained in the GNU Statement of Intent is “Building state capacity…Restructuring and improving state-owned entities to meet national development goals.”
In this context, the MTDP states that its ‘Strategic Priority 3’ is to ‘Build a Capable, Ethical and Developmental State’.
The Statement of Intent correctly recognised that the restructured and improved state-owned entities are an important element of the ‘Capable, Ethical and Developmental State’.
Obviously, the task to turn the SOEs into “empty shells” is completely at variance with the historic objective to ‘Build a Capable, Ethical and Developmental State’!
A matter of great concern in this regard is that it seems that the MTDP has not understood many important matters relevant to this subject concerning State capital and the democratic State.
We shall mention certain facts in this regard.
The MTDP says absolutely nothing about the attempted destruction of the SOEs by the Counter-Revolution as mentioned by Themba Khumalo and the Sunday World.
Instead, under the Strategic Priority 3 dealing with the ‘Capable State’, the MTDP makes this virtually vacuous observation:
Progress has been made in strengthening the governance of the SOEs. Previous weaknesses have contributed to systemic failures that also undermined the performance of the national economy. In response to these failures, the President established the Presidential State-Owned Enterprises Council (PSEC) which made several recommendations to improve performance.
This leaves unsaid the strategically important task to defend the SOEs, ensure their full recovery and even consider the need or otherwise further to increase the number of these SOEs.
Even before the 1994 democratic transition, the Democratic Movement insisted that ours must remain a mixed economy, with the two coexisting forces of private capital and State capital.
It was also intended that even if it was smaller in quantity than private capital, State capital should be strong enough to play an effective role in ensuring the building of an inclusive economy as well as serving the public good.
In this regard, the Democratic Movement was very mindful of the fact that the principal objective of private capital is profit maximization, not pursuit of the public good.
Seemingly oblivious of these considerations, the MTDP says nothing about the critical role of State capital both in ensuring the effectiveness of the Developmental State and in facilitating the achievement of its objectives.
Instead it says:
“A key action in the MTDP 2024-2029 is the establishment of a centralised ownership model for SOEs and the finalisation of the National State Enterprises Bill that will address structural and governance challenges…The 7th Administration will continue rationalising public entities, integrating relevant entities into departments and implementing shared service models.”
Given the central role of State capital in terms of the Developmental State, it is obvious that like other sections of Government, the conglomerate constituting State capital needs focused political leadership.
It was therefore incorrect and counter-productive to dissolve the Ministry and Department of Public Enterprises (DPE)!
The establishment of the “centralised ownership model for SOEs” through the creation of a ‘holding company’ does not solve the problem.
The decision to dissolve the DPE must be reversed.
The other matter mentioned by the MTDP of “integrating relevant entities into departments”, must also be revisited.
It is true that inevitably State capital will be invested in various sectors of the economy. However, it does not follow that this capital must come under the control of the particular Ministry heading the relevant economic sector.
The possibility to utilise the conglomerate of State capital as a strategic player in our mixed economy, and for strategic developmental objectives, argues against the creation of multiple controllers of this capital.
Once more, this emphasises the imperative to restore the DPE, mandated, among others, to lead the Government in deciding how to deploy the production factor represented by State capital.
THE DEMOCRATIC STATE AND DEVELOPMENT
We must understand all the immediate foregoing bearing in mind the strategic importance of the Developmental State in the context of defeating such structural defects in our country as unemployment, poverty and inequality.
Given the entrenchment of these, as a defining part of the legacy of colonialism and apartheid, it will be impossible to eradicate them without the instrumentality of the Developmental State.
Here we must refer to yet other correct observations made by Dr Endres in the same Address he delivered in 2023 in the US, entitled ‘The Weakening of the detrimental state’.
He said:
As the state becomes less and less capable, it is being increasingly bypassed by private actors. This process has been underway for a considerable time already. Those who can afford it rely on private healthcare and schooling, of a quality far higher than that provided by the state. In the absence of reliable electricity from the state-owned utility, those who can afford it install solar power on their rooftops…
Such replacements of state services by private entities are taking place all over South Africa. In urban areas, residents’ associations are fixing potholes, while in rural areas, farmers do the same. Civil society organisations like Solidarity are building technical schools and universities. Trash recyclers control traffic intersections when the lights are out. Large corporations provide security along freight rail corridors, while mining companies build clinics and provide housing and water near mines. Providers of mediation and arbitration services help resolve disputes without the involvement of the courts. Farmers help repair the water infrastructure where state neglect has left it derelict.
These observations are objectively correct and point to the fact that it will be difficult and challenging to establish the ‘Capable, Ethical and Developmental State’ mentioned in the MTDP.
In this context Dr Endres has said:
Third, a state could be receding in terms of its capabilities, even while its aspirations remain ambitious. This is the Third Age that South Africa is now transitioning into, although not many have realised it yet. We call this kind of a state the ‘emasculated state’
Dr Endres is therefore saying, categorically, that contrary to all talk about a Developmental State, objectively South Africa has entered into Age Three which will have an Emasculated State!
Concerning that Emasculated State he said:
This is where South Africa’s greatest opportunity for the future is to be found: in its innovative and resilient private sector and civil society, which are solving problems in the growing absence of the state, and doing so successfully. In years to come, South Africa may well become a case study of how private initiative succeeds where states fail.
And in future, South Africa could end up with an enabling, compact state – or a ‘lean state’ which cooperates with non-state actors instead of trying to stifle their efforts – with valuable lessons even for the developed world.
Accordingly, Dr Endres, the CEO of the South African Institute of Race relations is saying that rather than pursue the objective of a Developmental State, our country should allow for “innovative and resilient private sector and civil society, which are solving problems in the growing absence of the state”, and for a “compact or lean State” which would allow private capital and civil society funded by this capital, to assume the position of leadership of our country!
This would guarantee the perpetuation of the socio-economic legacy of colonialism and apartheid!
This is exactly the strategic result which the Counter-Revolution has sought as it has gone on an offensive to defeat both the ANC and the National Democratic Revolution!
We must therefore expect that the Counter-Revolution will not give up its efforts to produce the ‘Emasculated State’ which Dr Endres spoke about.
This demands that all the democrats in our country committed to building the democratic, non-racial and non-sexist South Africa visualised in our Constitution must sustain the struggle to ensure the building of ‘A Capable, Ethical and Developmental State’, which would lead the offensive to eradicate the legacy of colonialism and apartheid.
Similarly, it demands that these democratic forces must maintain the highest levels of vigilance against all maneuvers to sabotage this effort, including good-sounding initiatives which might emerge even from such institutions as Operation Vulindlela.
WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
Already by 2020, before the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, a consensus had emerged in South Africa that so complex and entrenched were the country’s socio-economic challenges that to address them successfully required the all-round cooperation of all the country’s social partners.
This was not the first time that this idea of purposeful cooperation among the social partners had arisen in our country.
In 1999 Business and Trade Union members of what was called the Millennium Labour Council (MLC) travelled to Ireland and the Netherlands driven by this idea. In its Report, the MLC said:
Ireland and the Netherlands were chosen for study because, from a position of economic crisis in the 1980s, they had undergone a profoundly successful economic transformation to become among the top performing economies in Europe and had at the same time maintained acceptable social policies.
In the process these countries had been immensely successful in creating jobs, and reducing unemployment significantly, when many of their European counterparts were experiencing rising levels of unemployment. A feature of the successful transformation in both countries had been intense social dialogue and a national consensus, on key economic and social issues.
When it reported on Ireland, the MLC delegation said:
In 1986, in response to its economic crisis, Ireland began to develop a national economic and social consensus involving Government, Employers, Trade Unions, Farmers and other interest groups. This consensus developed over time into a series of three-year national accords…
“While it is true that during this period Ireland has received significant EU grants, it is the accords that have been widely credited as the key factor in the country’s successful economic transformation.
“The size of the economy has more than doubled…Unemployment has dropped from 19% to less than 7%. Unit wage costs have declined but real income has improved…
What the MLC delegation was reporting after its visit to Europe in 1999 was that social compacts work in terms of extricating countries from entrenched socio-economic crises.
It was therefore not a surprise that 21 years later, President Ramaphosa would echo this sentiment.
When he addressed Parliament on 21 October 2020, President Ramaphosa said:
At this time, durable social compacts are more important than ever.
“It is through consensus-building between government, business, labour and civil society that we have been able to develop a common programme, and the same spirit of collaboration and partnership must guide us in the difficult days ahead…
Regardless of where we sit across the political divide, we must find the political courage to unite behind this common vision for our recovery.
Earlier, on 15 October of the same year, President Ramaphosa had said:
I wish to applaud the remarkable efforts, particularly from our social partners in NEDLAC, in reaching consensus on the actions required to rebuild our economy, and the firm actions that all social partners have committed to contribute to the country’s recovery.
We know from the examples of several other countries that social compacts are essential to effective and sustainable growth and development.
THE ERRP AND AERS DOCUMENTS
In a document it prepared for the NEDLAC process mentioned by President Ramaphosa, Business, organised as ‘Business for South Africa’ (B4SA) wrote:
…B4SA sought to formulate an integrated accelerated economic recovery strategy which harnesses South Africa’s potential in the shortest possible time by leveraging all resources – across government, business, and civil society – to address the economic challenges we face…
It is only on the basis of a coherent economic recovery strategy, clearly articulated and implemented competently, efficiently, and led with visible urgency, that we will be able to establish a new narrative about South Africa at a macro-economic level. This document sets out B4SA’s proposals to government in this regard…
The document produced by Business, through B4SA, is entitled “A New Inclusive Economic Future for South Africa: Delivering an Accelerated Economic Recovery Strategy”, (AERS).
For its part, the ‘South African Economic Reconstruction and Recovery Plan’, (ERRP), which President Ramaphosa tabled in Parliament in October 2020, on behalf of the Government says:
The Social Compact we are developing is two-fold in its mandate and manifestation. It is a compact between all the social partners in the South African eco-system. It will establish shared values and a unified vision for the reconstruction and recovery of South Africa’s economy. It will bring together the collective forces of labour, business and communities rural and urban alike, then we will be able to harness the full capacity and potential of our resources…
“Already, the South African Economic Recovery and Reconstruction Plan is a product of social dialogue and compacting. It builds on the broad consensus among social partners on what needs to be done to drive economic recovery and reconstruction…Social partners have made collective and individual commitments in respect of all the priority focus areas of the Plan…While the contribution of each social partner on any of the specific outcomes of the Plan may not be equal or simultaneous, each social partner has an important role to play in the implementation of the Plan.”
Working through NEDLAC, the Social Partners produced proposals intended to form part of the Social Compact to which these Partners were committed.
Tabled five years ago. In 2020, the ERRP said the following should be the Priority Interventions:
(a) Aggressive infrastructure investment;
(b) Employment orientated strategic localisation, reindustrialisation and
export promotion;
(c) Energy security;
(d) Support for tourism recovery and growth;
(e) Gender equality and economic inclusion of women and youth;
(f) Green economy interventions;
(g) Mass public employment interventions;
(h) Strengthening food security; and
(i) Macro-economic interventions.
It went further to identify the Key Enablers for these Priority interventions as:
(j) Resource mobilisation;
(k) Regulatory changes, a supportive policy environment and enabling
conditions for the ease of doing business;
(l) Building a capable state;
(m) Social compacting;
(n) Skills development; as well as
(o) Economic diplomacy and further integration into the African continent.
Happily the AERS agreed with both these Policy Interventions and Key Enablers as listed in the ERRP. We would like to believe that both Labour and Civil Society within NEDLAC were of the same view.
It therefore seemed obvious there was indeed a broad consensus among the NEDLAC Social Partners about the overall framework for the necessary Economic Reconstruction and Recovery Plan.
The B4SA went further in terms of providing many details to give concrete form and content to its AERS.
It said the AERS was a proposed three-year programme. If implemented in full as proposed, it would require R3,4 trillion worth of investment during the stated three-year period.
It made a commitment that Business would produce R1 trillion of this investment.
It said the Government and the public sector as a whole would have to advance the
remaining R2,4 trillion. As a Plan, it went further even to propose how this sum could be generated.
With regard to the R1 trillion we have just mentioned, we must point out that this was the very first time since 1994, i.e. during the lifetime of democratic South Africa, that collectively the private sector made a commitment to invest in our country’s economy!
As we have said, the EARS went further to provide many details concerning the various elements in its Strategy/Plan.
Commenting on work done, B4SA said:
Specifically, the work has synthesised and prioritised 12 key projects and initiatives, from a list of over 50, some of which can be launched immediately and others progressively, across 10 high impact sectors. There have also been 12 policy focus areas identified, which could increase GDP by over R1 trillion (tn), generate 1.5 million (m) jobs, and increase tax revenues by R100 billion (bn) per annum. In addition, we have identified 15 immediate actions that will improve consumer and business confidence and that do not require government policy changes to implement. We need decisive leadership, together with appropriate capacity and expertise, to implement these immediate actions.”
Under a sub-section entitled Industry Summary, the AERS says:
‘The AERS is an opportunity to generate up to 1.5 million jobs, increase GDP by over R1 trillion and increase tax revenues by R100bn per annum (during the AERS three-year period).’
Under this sub-heading it lists the following Growth and Development Sectors:
1. SMMEs, Township and Rural Economy;
2. Energy & Water;
3. Mining;
4. Construction;
5. Manufacturing;
6. Transport;
7. Agriculture;
8. Financial Services;
9. Telecommunications; and,
10. Tourism & Leisure.
Fortunately, the ERRP also identified the same sectors as areas of special focus. This means that at least two of the NEDLAC partners agreed on where to focus to achieve the required growth and development. We imagined that the other two partners, Labour and Civil Society, would also agree.
Further to illustrate the objectives which had to be achieved, the AERS says the sector interventions listed above would result in these Projects & Initiatives:
11. Secure and affordable electricity supply;
12. Fast track green economy;
13. Implement Transnet’s road to rail strategy;
14. Ports expansion;
15. Road infrastructure;
16. Full spectrum utilisation;
17. E-learning & digital health platforms;
18. E-commerce acceleration;
19. Water infrastructure;
20. Maximise commercial agricultural output;
21. Import replacement focus; and,
22. Increased financial inclusion and lower cost of capital.
We must repeat that with regard to each and all these identified matters, the AERS contains specific details about what should be done.
The foregoing suggests that during the NEDLAC process which started in 2020 to conclude a Social Compact:
● sufficient progress was made in terms of developing a consensus among the Social Partners about the Vision or Policy Objectives which must inform the detailed negotiations; and,
● one of the Social Partners, Business, had produced a detailed economic renewal plan and programme which provided the Social Partners with a solid foundation on which to base their detailed negotiations to conclude the Social Compact.
Further, enough exchanges had taken place among the Social Partners for them to be able accurately to identify any obstacles which might emerge, and therefore to find the necessary solutions.
For instance, during the December 2020 NEDLAC Annual Summit Meeting, the Business representative, Mr. Martin Kingston, said that:
…We have not acted with the necessary resolve and urgency to address the economic, social, and fiscal crises we face…We need to move beyond ideological debates to a real time and pragmatic, fact-based assessment of our circumstances.
In that context, Government must show leadership in rising above ideology to implement critical actions that are in their domain. We recognise the difficulty of making hard choices and trade-offs but that is the reality confronting us and is clearly visible to all stakeholders…
When the TMF engaged the Labour and Community Sector NEDLAC Social Partners, they also agreed that the Government was not discharging its responsibility to ensure the necessary forward movement towards the conclusion of the Social Compact.
THE TMF AND THE SOCIAL PARTNERS
Because it was keenly interested in the successful conclusion of the Social Compact, this Foundation, the Thabo Mbeki Foundation, kept contact with, and engaged each of the Social Partners especially when the TMF felt that the NEDLAC process had stalled.
During 2021 the TMF engaged each of the Social Partners to find out what might be blocking progress towards concluding the urgent Social Compact. The Partners requested that after it had concluded its consultations, the TMF should communicate its findings and recommendations to them.
The TMF accordingly circulated among the Social Partners a Report entitled “Report of the Thabo Mbeki Foundation on its Engagements with the NEDLAC Social Partners and Proposals on a Way Forward”,dated September 2021.
Among others, this Report said:
“All social partners are united in the conviction that the only way out of our country’s socio-economic crisis is through a social compact which (partners) we suggest must urgently agree on an Implementation Plan for Economic Reconstruction and Recovery (IP-ERR)…
“Accordingly, we propose that:
• the Presidency should urgently set up the necessary mechanism to convene the members of the social compact to negotiate the IP-ERR;
• as soon as possible the Presidency should convene the first meeting of the social partners outside the NEDLAC forum;
• the social partners should accept the South African Economic Reconstruction and Recovery Plan (ERRP) presented by the President of the Republic to Parliament and the Nation in October 2020 as the Framework within which to negotiate the IP-ERR;
• the detailed negotiations to produce the IP-ERR should use as their base document the “A New Inclusive Economic Future for South Africa: Delivering an Accelerated Economic Recovery Strategy” (AERS) published in July 2020 by Business for South Africa (B4SA); and,
• the social partners should finalise the IP-ERR by 28 February 2022.
All the Social Partners received the TMF Report.
However, absolutely nothing happened even to discuss the Proposals contained in that Report.
The reality was that the NEDLAC process urgently to conclude a Social Compact had died!
The strange thing about this extremely negative development is that absolutely nobody made an announcement that the process to conclude a Social Compact had been terminated!
CONCLUSION
It seems that all that happened was that the Social Partners allowed the process to wither away.
It makes no sense that this happened because so much good work had been done, with the goal of agreeing on a Social Compact not being too far away.
Could it be that someone or some people took fright at this prospect, and used all means at their disposal to kill the process towards the conclusion of a Social Compact!
Who could this be?
In this context we must recall what the Business representative said in December 2020 that the Social Partners had “not acted with the necessary resolve and urgency to address the economic, social and fiscal crises (the country faces)…”
Instead, these, including Government, quietly abandoned the collective effort to address these crises, and therefore turned their backs on the masses of our people who everyday cry out to be extricated from a miserable life of poverty and extreme deprivation.
To replace the inclusive NEDLAC process, Government and Business decided to enter into their own Partnership, excluding Labour and the Community Constituency.
In October 2024, President Ramaphosa proudly launched what he described as ‘Phase 2 of the Government Business Partnership’, with the Partnership having been launched in 2023 at the request and prompting of Business.
Exactly because it serves its interests, Business, through the Business Unity South Africa, BUSA, Vice President, Mr Adrian Gore, warmly welcomed this Phase 2.
Among other things, this Phase 2 aims to support the acceleration of the so-called market reform relating to Eskom in favour of private capital and facilitating private sector investment in Transnet, including launching access for private sector operations on the rail network by the last Quarter of 2024.
Obviously, Government and Business find it comfortable to exclude Organised Labour and the Community Constituency from processes, encapsulated in the said ‘Phase 2’, which President Ramaphosa said, “will continue to tackle key challenges, and contribute to momentum on transformation, economic recovery and long-term prosperity.”
Earlier in this document we reported on the alert that has been sounded about what this Government Business Partnership wants to do with Transnet!
As the Millennium Labour Council (MLC) advised twenty-five years ago, it is imperative that our country learns from the experiences of such countries as Ireland and the Netherlands, and urgently return to the task to negotiate and conclude a Social Compact.
The incontrovertible reality is that no transformative socio-economic programme capable of extricating our country from the general crisis in which it is immersed will emerge outside of a solemn agreement between Government, Business, Organised Labour and the Community Constituency.
The Government Business Partnership, which some have welcomed and promoted with exaggerated claims of success, will not end the general crisis we have mentioned which is gripping our country.
In its 1999 Statement the MLC said:
South Africa’s different circumstances, higher unemployment, sharper inequality, deeper ideological differences, and a larger population, far from being a deterrent, require of us a greater responsibility and a firmer resolve to meet the challenge of successful economic transformation.
The time has come that the masses of our people, acting through all their organisations, must act firmly to ensure that the powers that be respond to this challenge by urgently negotiating and concluding a Social Compact aimed at extricating our country from the general crisis which has condemned millions of our people to the status of truly being the wretched of the earth!
END 3/3
Discover more from Radio Freedom
Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.
